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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction over this

appeal pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann. (1992),
and pursuant to the Supreme Court' s transfer of the appeal
pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

denying Myers' motion for leave to file amended counterclaim?
2.

Did the trial court properly dismiss Myers'

contract and quasi-contract claims on grounds that the claims
were barred by the real estate licensing laws and the Statute of
Frauds?
3.

Did the trial court properly dismiss Myers' fraud

claim on grounds that Myers presented insufficient evidence to
satisfy his clear and convincing burden of proof?
4.

Did the trial court properly dismiss Myers'

contract claims against MPM on grounds that the broker licensing
statutes bar the claims and that MPM did not have an obligation,
express or implied, to assure that Andalex compensated Myers?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

The Court reviews the district court' s order

denying Myers leave to amend his counterclaim (issue 1 above)
under an abuse of discretion standard.

"[T]he granting of leave

to amend is a matter which lies within the broad discretion of
the court, and its rulings are not to be disturbed in the
221X25392.1

absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion resulting in
prejudice to the complaining party. •' Girard v. Applebv, 660
P. 2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983),

See also Westley v. Farmer' s Ins.

Exch. . 663 P. 2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983); Chadwick v. Nielsen. 763
P. 2d 817, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
2.

In reviewing an order granting summary judgment

(issues 2, 3 and 4 above), the Court "view[s] the facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to the losing party," and
reviews the district court' s legal conclusions for correctness.
Pratt ex. rel. Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co. . 813 P. 2d
1169, 1171 (Utah 1991).

The Court will affirm summary judgment

if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Frisbee v.

K&K Constr. Co. , 676 P. 2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Interpretation of the following statutory provisions
may be determinative of some of the issues raised by this
appeal:
25-5-4.

Certain agreements void unless written and
subscribed.
In the following cases every agreement shall be void
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith:
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compens ati on.

-2221X25392.1

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989).
78-12-25.

Within four years.
Within four years:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing;
also on an open account for goods, wares, and
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store
account; also on an open account for work, labor or
services rendered, or materials furnished; provided,
that action in all of the foregoing cases may be
commenced at any time within four years after the last
charge is made or the last payment is received.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1992).
61-2-2.

Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(7) "Principal real estate broker" and "principal
broker" means:
(a) any person who for another and for valuable
consideration, or who with the intention or in
the expectation or upon the promise of receiving
or collecting valuable consideration, sells,
exchanges, purchases, rents, or leases or
negotiates the sale, exchange, purchase, rental,
or leasing of, or offers or attempts or agrees to
negotiate the sale, exchange, purchase, rental,
or leasing of, or lists or offers or attempts or
agrees to list, or auctions, or offers or
attempts or agrees to collect rental for the use
of real estate or who advertises, who buys or
offers to buy, sells or offers to sell, or
otherwise deals in options on real estate or the
improvements thereon or who collects or offers or
attempts or agrees to collect rental for the use
of real estate or who advertises or holds
himself, itself, or themselves out as engaged in
the business of selling, exchanging, purchasing,
renting, or leasing real estate, or assists or
directs in the procuring of prospects or the
negotiations or closing of any transaction which
does or is calculated to result in the sale,
exchange, leasing, or renting of any real estate;

-3221X25392.1

(8) "Real estate" includes leaseholds and business
opportunities involving real property.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(7)-(8) (1989).
61-2-18(1),

Actions for recovery of compensation restricted.

(1) No person may bring or maintain an action in any
court of this state for the recovery of a commission,
fee, or compensation for any act done or service
rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to
other than licensed principal brokers, unless the
person was duly licensed as a principal broker at the
time of the doing of the act or rendering the service.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(1) (1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This action was commenced in July, 1986 by Andalex
Resources, Inc. and AMCA Coal Leasing, Inc. (jointly "Andalex")
to obtain a declaratory judgment that Richard B. Myers and Myers
& Company (jointly "Myers") are not entitled to recover from
Andalex any fee or other compensation for allegedly acting as a
broker in connection with Andalex' s purchase of certain coal
leases situated within the State of Utah.

x

Andalex purchased

the leases from Malapai Resources, Inc, ("Malapai"), New Albion
Resources Company (now known as Pacific Diversified Capital
Company) ("Pacific"), and Mono Power Company ("Mono").

In the

Complaint, Andalex asserts that, among other things, any claim

1

This action was originally commenced by Andalex against
Richard B. Myers and Myers, Inc. However, Myers & Company was
substituted for Myers, Inc. by order of the district court.
(Record ("R. " ) 175. )
-4221X25392. 1

of Myers to recover any compensation is barred by the Statute of
Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989), and by the real estate
broker licensing statutes, Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(1)(1989).
Myers counterclaimed against Andalex seeking recovery of
compensation for his services for acting as a "finder" in
connection with Andalex' s purchase of the coal leases, asserting
theories of breach of contract, quantum meruit, fraud and
negligent misrepresentation.
Myers also filed a counterclaim against Malapai,
Pacific and Mono. 2

In his counterclaim, Myers alleges that

Malapai, Pacific and Mono entered into a contract which provided
that Myers would act on behalf of Malapai, Pacific and Mono to
find a sublessee, assignee or purchaser of the coal leases.
Under the express terms of the contract, Malapai, Pacific and
Mono had no obligation to compensate Myers for these services.
Myers contends, however, that the contract contained an implied
obligation that Malapai, Pacific and Mono would assure that any
sublessee, assignee or purchaser of the coal lease would
compensate Myers.

Myers alleges that Malapai, Pacific and Mono

breached the contract by failing to assure that Andalex would
compensate Myers.

Myers also alleges that Malapai, Pacific and

1

Myers originally filed a third-party complaint against
Malapai, Pacific and Mono. By order of the district court,
Malapai, Pacific and Mono were made plaintiffs in this action,
and Myers' third-party complaint was deemed a counterclaim. (R.
175. )
-5221X25392 1

Mono intentionally interfered with Myers' prospective economic
relationship with Andalex.
B.

The Course of the Proceedings

On February 22, 1991, the district court entered an
order granting Andalex partial summary judgment, declaring that
the Statute of Frauds and the broker licensing statutes
precluded any contract or quasi-contract claims for compensation
by Myers.

The court also dismissed Myers' counterclaim against

Andalex for breach of contract and quasi-contract. (R. 370-72.)
On October 11, 1991, the district court denied Myers'
motion for leave to file an amended counterclaim.

(R. 476-77.)

The proposed amended counterclaim contained a new claim against
Andalex based upon a theory that Andalex had agreed to enter in
a partnership with Myers regarding the coal leases.

(R. 380-

86. )
On May 2 7, 1992, the district court entered a Summary
Judgment and Order dismissing the remaining fraud and negligent
misrepresentation claims against Andalex.

(R. 882-84.)

On the

same date, the district court also entered a Summary Judgment
and Order dismissing all claims against Malapai, Pacific and
Mono.

(R. 885-87. )

-6221X25392.1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Malapai, Pacific and Mono (hereinafter jointly

"MPM") were the joint owners of certain coal leases ("Leases")
granted by the United States and the State of Utah. The Leases
concern approximately 47,000 acres of real property situated in
Kane County, Utah.
2.

(R. 130. )

Myers entered into a letter agreement dated

May 2 3, 1979 with MPM, (Addendum, Ex. A ) , which provided, among
other things, that Myers would act as a "finder" for MPM in
locating a coal mining company to produce coal from the Leases
or find a sublessee, assignee or purchaser of the Leases.
131*. )

(R.

Myers testified that he was to act as a "finder" on

behalf of MPM.3
3.

(R. 539-40.)

The agreement between Myers and MPM was further

evidenced by a letter dated May 5, 1980, (Addendum, Ex. B), a
letter dated March 18, 1981, (Addendum, Ex. C ) , and a letter
dated March 24, 1981, (Addendum, Ex. D).

(R. 582-85, 542-44. )

Myers testified that these letters accurately reflected his

3

Myers contends that James Wilson, acting as an employee
of Pacific and as an agent for Malapai and Mono, approached
Myers in Kentucky seeking to employ Myers. (Brief of Appellants
at 7, 1f 8. ) To support this contention, Myers cites to his
counterclaim filed in this action. (R. 139. ) A citation to
one' s own pleading to support a factual contention in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment is inappropriate and the
contention should be disregarded. Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P. 2d
224, 226-27 (Utah 1983); Thornock v. Cook. 604 P. 2d 934, 936
(Utah 1979); United Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Willev. 21 Utah 2d 279,
444 P. 2d 755, 758-59 (1968).
-7221X25392.1

understanding of the compensation arrangement between the
parties.

(R. 547-52. )
4.

Under the arrangement between Myers and MPM,

Myers was to be compensated by the sublessee, assignee or
purchaser of the Leases, and not by MPM.

(R. 540, 545-46, 551-

52. )
5.

Eventually, Myers located W. R. Grace & Co.

("Grace") and introduced Grace to MPM.

(R. 131, 582-85. )

After

some negotiations, on or about July 23, 1981, Grace and Myers
entered into option agreements (the "Options") with Malapai and
Pacific, whereby Malapai and Pacific granted to Grace and Myers
an option for the acquisition of their interests in the
Leases.4

(R. 553-55, 578, 582-85, 609.)
6.

On or about July 12, 1981 Grace and Myers entered

into an agreement to compensate Myers, under certain terms and
conditions, for "his efforts in bringing the parties together."
(R. 131, 556-58.)

Under this agreement, Myers would only

receive compensation if Grace exercised the Options. (R. 654-60,
788-815. )

4

In Myers' Brief he claims that the Options were entered
into with Pacific and Mono.
(Brief of Appellants at 8, H 11.)
However, the portion of the Record that Myers cites, (R. 213),
states that the Options were in fact entered into with Malapai
and Pacific, and not Mono. Myers' testimony supports the fact
that Mono did not execute an option. (R. 553-55.)
-8221X25392.1

7.

Because of the expense, Grace was unwilling to

exercise the Options and proceed with the acquisition of the
Leases without a financial partner willing to share the risk.
Additionally, Grace was unwilling to exercise the Options
without a market for the coal.

(R. 661-70, 702-03, 708-10, 715-

20. )
8.
1982.

Grace allowed the Options to expire in August

However, Myers contends that he had an informal

arrangement with Malapai and Pacific that, notwithstanding the
expiration of the Options, they would transfer their interest in
the Leases to Grace if it elected to proceed.
03,

708-10.)

(R. 669-70, 702-

According to Myers, for this reason, he continued

to look for a company which was capable and willing to enter a
joint venture with Grace.
9.

(R. 702-04. )

Myers eventually contacted Andalex in

approximately September 1982, and arranged for negotiations
between Grace and Andalex regarding a joint venture for the
development of the Leases.

(R. 131, 610, 582-85, 702-07, 712-

714. )
10.

Discussions between Grace and Andalex continued

into 1984. (R. 613-17.)

Eventually, Grace determined not to go

forward with the purchase and development of the Leases. (R.
131-32, 582-85, 613-17, 651-52. )
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11.

Andalex, however, was still interested in

purchasing the Leases and commenced negotiations directly with
MPM.

According to Myers, he arranged and attended some of the

meetings between those parties. (R. 132, 582-85, 722-25. )
12.

The agreement between Myers and MPM did not

prohibit MPM from negotiating directly with potential
sublessees, assignees or purchasers.
13.

(R. 561-63, 597. )

At a meeting on March 28, 1985 between MPM and

Andalex, in the presence of Myers and his attorney, Andalex made
clear its understanding and intention that it had no agreement
to compensate Myers.
meeting.

Myers made no claim to the contrary at the

(R. 672-76, 727-33, 783-87, 816-18. )
14.

On or about September 10, 1985, Andalex entered

into an agreement with MPM to purchase the Leases.

(R. 132,

582-85. )
15.

Myers alleges that Andalex agreed to compensate

Myers by assuming the position of Grace under the July 12, 1981
agreement between Grace and Myers.

(R. 133, 383. )

There is no

written document or memorandum signed by Andalex evidencing this
purported agreement between Andalex and Myers.
16.

(R. 586-87.)

Myers believes that Robert Anderson, the

President of Andalex and the only officer of Andalex with whom
Myers had any dealings concerning compensation, was honest in

-10221X25392.1

his dealing with Myers and was not attempting to deceive Myers.
(R. 876-78.)

Myers specifically testified as follows:

Q. Do you know of any other facts that lead
you to believe that Mr. Anderson intended to
deceive or mislead you concerning
compensation to you regarding the work you
performed in connection with the Kaiparowits
leases?
A. I think the only thing that they did
that was deceiving to us was to go around
Grace prior to telling us that they were
going to do it. I don' t think Mr. Anderson
was attempting to deceive us. He was just
like he always was, straight upfront.
(R. 877-78. )
17.

Myers has no knowledge of any facts that support

the claim that Andalex was not acting in good faith in
negotiating with Grace.

Myers testified as follows:

Q. Do you know of any facts that lead you
to believe that Mr. Anderson or anyone from
Andalex did not enter into discussions with
Grace in good faith?
A. I don' t know what their thinking was;
therefore, my answer is no.
(R. 878. )
18.

Each officer of Andalex involved with the

purchase of the Leases has testified that nothing that MPM did
or did not do caused Andalex to refuse to enter into a contract
with Myers or to compensate Myers.
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(R. 529, 569-71, 675-76. )

19.

Myers has no knowledge of any instance where MPM

in anyway interfered with Andalex compensating Myers.

(R. 564-

65. )
20. Myers has no knowledge of any intentional act of
MPM made to cause harm to Myers.
21.

(R. 565. )

Myers holds no license in Utah or Kentucky to act

as a real estate broker.

(R. 275-76, 595. )

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Myers argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for leave to file an amended
counterclaim, even though the motion was made almost five years
after the case was initiated.

As will be shown below, the

district court properly denied this motion because the proposed
new claim was legally insufficient -- it was barred by the
statute of limitations, the real estate broker licensing laws,
and the Statute of Frauds.

Moreover, the claim was properly

denied because Myers was unduly dilatory in seeking leave to
amend the counterclaim.
Myers also contends that the trial court improperly
dismissed his contract and quasi-contract claims against
Andalex.

Myers suggests that although the real estate licensing

laws on their face clearly bar his claim, they should not apply
because Myers' conduct does not fall within the "purpose" of the
licensing requirements.

This Court has previously expressly
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rejected this type of argument and should do so again here.

In

addition, the court properly found that these claims were barred
by the Statute of Frauds.
Myers suggests that the trial court should not have
dismissed his fraud claim against Andalex, even though Myers'
own testimony established that Andalex did not have the
requisite intent to deceive.

We will show, among other things,

that because Myers was unable to satisfy his burden of "clear
and convincing" proof on this essential element, summary
judgment was properly granted.
Finally, Myers argues that his contract claims against
MPM should not have been dismissed.

As will be shown below,

however, the trial court properly concluded that the broker
licensing statutes barred this claim and that MPM had no
obligation, express or implied, to assure that Andalex
compensated Myers.
As set forth more fully below, the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
On May 23, 1991, almost five years after the case was

initiated, Myers filed a motion for leave to file an amended
counterclaim against Andalex.

In the proposed amended

counterclaim, Myers asserted a new cause of action against
-13221X25392.1

Andalex based upon an alleged agreement that Andalex would enter
into a partnership or joint venture with Myers.

(R. 380-83.)

The original counterclaim sought recovery of compensation
allegedly owing to Myers for acting as a "finder" in connection
with Andalex' s purchase of the Leases.

(R. 380-83. )

The motion for leave to file an amended counterclaim
was properly denied by the district court on any of a number of
grounds before the district court including (1) the new
partnership claim was barred by the statute of limitations, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1992); (2) the claim was barred by the
real estate broker licensing laws, Utah Code Ann. § 61-218(1)(1989); (3) the claim was barred by the Statute of Frauds,
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989); and (4) Myers had been unduly
dilatory in seeking leave to amend the counterclaim.5
A.

Standard of Review

The Court reviews the district court' s order denying
Myers leave to amend his counterclaim under an abuse of

An appellate court will sustain a lower court decision
on any proper grounds. Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P. 2d 326,
328 (Utah 1980); Baashaw v. Baashaw, 788 P. 2d 1057, 1060 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); Arizona Bd. of Regents v. States ex. rel. State
of Ariz. Pub. Safety Retirement Fund Manager Adm' r, 771 P.2d
880, 884 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); LaMon v. Butler. 770 P. 2d 1027,
1031 (Wash.), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Accordingly,
if any one of the various grounds for denying the motion is
found by this Court to be meritorious, or not an abuse of
discretion by the district court, as applicable, then the order
denying the motion for leave should be sustained.
-14221X25392.1

discretion standard.

" [T]he granting of leave to amend is a

matter which lies within the broad discretion of the court, and
its rulings are not to be disturbed in the absence of a showing
of an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the
complaining party. "
1983).

Girard v. Appleby. 660 P. 2d 245, 248 (Utah

See also Westlev v. Farmed s Ins. Exch. . 663 P. 2d 93, 94

(Utah 1983); Chadwick v. Nielsen. 763 P. 2d 817, 820 (Utah Ct.
App.

1988).
B.

The Proposed Partnership Claim is Barred by the
Applicable Statute of Limitations

It is fundamental that leave to file an amended
pleading should be denied when the moving party seeks leave to
assert a new claim that is frivolous or legally insufficient.
E. a. , Black Canvon Racauetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat' 1
Bank. N. A. , 804 P. 2d 900, 904 (Idaho 1991); Conrad v. Imatani,
724 P. 2d 89, 94 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).

Thus, a motion for leave

to file an amended complaint should be denied when a new claim
is asserted that is barred by a statute of limitations.

Oliner

v. McBride' s Indus. . Inc. . 106 F. R. D. 9, 12 (S. D. N. Y. 1985);
Cooper v. Thomas, 456 So. 2d 280, 283 (Ala. 1984).
In this instance, Myers7 new claim of breach of an
oral contract to enter into a partnership agreement is barred by
the limitation contained in section 78-12-25 of the Utah Code
which provides that an action on an oral contract must be
commenced within four years.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1)
-15-
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(1992); Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 25 P. 2d
952, 958 (1933).

The alleged breach by Andalex occurred by no

later than September 1985, when Andalex acquired the Leases.
The limitation period began to run at that time.

Last Chance

Ranch, 25 P. 2d at 958; Butcher v. Gilrov. 744 P. 2d 311, 313
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).

To avoid the bar, Myers' new claim had to

be filed no later than September 1989.

It was not.

The motion

for leave to file the amended counterclaim was not filed until
May 23, 1991, approximately 18 months beyond the statutory
period.
Myers can only avoid the application of the statute of
limitations if his new claim relates back to the date of filing
the original counterclaim, as provided in Rule 15(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. 6

For a new claim to relate back

under Rule 15(c), it must arise out of the same conduct,
transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading.
Norman v. Nichiro GyogYQ Kaisha. Ltd. . 645 P. 2d 191, 198 (Alaska
1982) (amendment relates back if based on "same specific

Rule 15(c) provides:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in
the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, the amendment relates
back to the date of the original pleading.
Utah R. Civ. P. 15 (c).
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conduct" ), overruled in part on other grounds, Hikita v. Nichico
Gyogvo Kaisha, Ltd. . 713 P. 2d 1197 (Alaska 1986); Mever v. Ford
Indus. , Inc. , 622 P. 2d 1139, 1141 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (amendment
relates back if based on the same conduct).

An amendment which

merely amplifies or clarifies a prior pleading will relate back.
Oliner, 106 F. R. D. at 12; Cooper, 456 So. 2d at 283-84.
Generally, a new cause of action asserted by way of amendment
will relate back if the defending party should have known from
the original pleading the new facts and new claim based on those
facts alleged in the amended pleading.

E. g. . Percy v. San

Francisco Gen. Host*. . 841 F. 2d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 1988); cf.
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc. , 786 P. 2d 1350, 1359-60
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 795 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1990);
Augusta Bank & Trust v. Broomfield, 643 P. 2d 100, 105 (Kan.
1982); 6A Charles A. Wright et al. , Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1497, at 85 (2d ed. 1990).
However, when an amended pleading asserts a new cause
of action based on new or additional conduct, transactions or
occurrences, the amendment does not relate back.

Holmes v.

Greyhound Lines. Inc. . 757 F. 2d 1563, 1566 (5th Cir. 1985).

In

Welch v. Continental Placement, Inc. , 627 S. W. 2d 319 (Mo. Ct.
App.

1982), the court held:

"If the amended pleading, however,

requires proof of ultimate facts different from those necessary
to sustain the original claim and thus adds a new cause of
action, the amendment does not relate back so as to save the
-17221X25392.1

action from the bar of limitations."

627 S. W. 2d at 321.

See

also Dillard v. Vicksbura Medical Ctr. , Inc. . 695 F. Supp. 880,
883 (S. D. Miss. 1988).7
In this case, Myers originally sought to recover
compensation for acting as a finder in connection with Andalex' s
acquisition of the Leases.

By the amended counterclaim, Myers

set forth a new cause of action based upon an alleged agreement
that Andalex would enter into a partnership or joint venture
with Myers.

(Brief of Appellants at 12-13.)

The two agreements

are different and distinct, and therefore will require different
elements of proof.8

Moreover, there was no notice to Andalex

7

For other cases, see Graboi v. Kibel. 432 F. Supp. 572
(S. D. N. Y. 1977) (rape victim's claim of inadequate security did
not relate back to claims against building owner based on
vicarious liability for the intentional tort of the employee and
breach of contract); Kimbrel v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. , 476
So. 2d 94, 96 (Ala. 1985) (claim of fraud in connection with a
sale did not relate back to other claims concerning sale); Wing
v. Martin, 688 P. 2d 1172, 1175 (Idaho 1984) (claim of failure to
warn and properly label a product did not relate back to claim
of failure to prevent misuse of product).
8

Counsel for Myers recognizes that the partnership
claim would involve proof of facts different from those
necessary to sustain the original claims against Andalex.
Counsel stated to the district court when requesting leave to
amend: "May we have leave to amend, Your Honor, to specifically
get the Shire facts before the court?" (R. 932. ) (The decision
of Shire Develop, v. Frontier Invs. . 799 P. 2d 221 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) is the case relied upon by Myers to support his
partnership claim against Andalex. )
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of the partnership claim contained in the original
counterclaim.9
The claim does not relate back to the original claim
and is therefore barred by the statute of limitations.

The

district court properly denied Myers' motion for leave to file
the amended counterclaim.
C.

The Proposed Partnership Claim is
Barred by the Statute of Frauds and the
Broker Licensing Laws

Regardless of whether the partnership claim is a new
and distinct claim or merely a reformulation of Myers' original
claim, it is still a claim to compensate Myers for acting as a
broker.

The claim, therefore, is barred by the Statute of

Frauds and the broker licensing statutes.

9

The new cause of

Rinawood v. Foreign Auto Works. Inc. . 786 P. 2d 1350 (Utah
Ct. App. ), cert, denied. 795 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1990), relied upon
heavily by Myers, is not controlling. In Rinawood, the Court,
under an abuse of discretion standard, affirmed the district
court' s order permitting amendment of a plaintiff s pleading.
The Court focused largely upon whether the defendants who
opposed the amendment were aware of the basis for the amended
claim prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.
The court noted that the amended claim conformed with a position
argued by the defendants themselves, before the statute of
limitations had run. Initially, the plaintiff had argued that
certain agreements were controlling, while the defendants had
argued that a different agreement was controlling. When the
plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to base his claims on
the agreement defendants argued controlled, the Court found no
prejudice to the defendants. 1&. at 1360. In the instant case,
there was no claim of a partnership or partnership agreement
prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations and motion
for amended counterclaim, nor have Andalex or MPM ever made such
a claim.
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action is based upon a breach of an alleged agreement by Andalex
to enter into a partnership with Myers.

Myers contends that

Andalex agreed to assume the position of Grace under the July
12, 1981 agreement between Grace and Myers.

Presumably to avoid

application of the Statute of Frauds and the broker licensing
statutes, Myers does not claim that the agreement allegedly
assumed by Andalex was to compensate Myers for acting as a
finder.

However, the agreement between Grace and Myers that

Andalex allegedly assumed recites that it was to compensate
Myers for "his efforts in bringing the parties together."

(R.

131; see also 556-58. )10
Regardless of how the alleged agreement between
Andalex and Myers is now characterized, it is still an agreement
to compensate Myers for acting as a finder.

Accordingly, to

enforce the agreement, Myers must show that the agreement
satisfies the provisions of Utah' s Statute of Frauds and the
broker licensing laws.

Myers made no such showing.

Myers was not a licensed real estate broker.

He is

therefore precluded from maintaining an action for compensation
for acting as a broker by reason of section 61-2-18(1) of the

10

Myers describes the agreement as an agreement to
compensate Myers "for his efforts in introducing Grace to the
opportunities presented by the coal leases." (Brief of
Appellants at 12. ) In both the original counterclaim and the
proposed amended counterclaim, Myers describes the agreement as
providing "for certain compensation for Mr. Myers as a result of
his efforts in bringing the parties together. " (Brief of
Appellants at 15. )
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Utah Code.n

See infra part II. B.

Furthermore, because there

was no writing reflecting the alleged agreement between Andalex
and Myers regarding compensation, Myers' claim for compensation
is barred by the Statute of Frauds.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4

(1989). 12
As noted above, a motion for leave to file an amended
pleading should be denied if the amended pleading fails to state
a claim.

See supra p. 15.

The proposed partnership claim

asserted by Myers is without merit because it is barred by both
the Statute of Frauds and the broker licensing laws.

The

Section 61-2-18(1) provides:
No person may bring or maintain an action in
any court of this state for the recovery of
a commission, fee, or compensation for any
act done or service rendered which is
prohibited under this chapter to other than
licensed principal brokers. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(1) (1989).
Section 25-5-4 provides:
In the following cases every agreement shall
be void unless such agreement ... is in
writing subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith: ... (5) Every agreement
authorizing or employing an agent or broker
to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989). The current version
of Section 25-5-4(5) remains substantially unchanged.
See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(5) (Supp. 1992).
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district court properly denied Myers' motion for leave to assert
this meritless claim.
D.

Myers Was Unduly Dilatory in Seeking to File the
Amended Counterclaim

A motion to amend should be denied if the party
seeking the amendment has been unduly dilatory.

Wood v. Santa

Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc. , 705 F. 2d 1515, 1520 (9th Cir.
1983), cert, denied. 465 U.S. 1081 (1984); see also Lindev' s.
Inc. v. Professional Consultants, Inc. , 797 P. 2d 920, 923 (Mont.
1990) (quoting Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962)).

When

a considerable amount of time has elapsed since the commencement
of the action, a party seeking leave to amend bears the burden
of showing some adequate reason for the delay.

See Tripp v.

Vauahn, 746 P. 2d 794, 797 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (court did not
abuse discretion in denying motion to amend where plaintiff was
unable to state adequate reason for delay and opposing party
claimed p r e j u d i c e ) ;

53? frlgQ Fefler^l I n s ? QQ, VT Qfrteg

L^^yj^t

Corp. , 823 F. 2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1987) ("Courts have denied
leave to amend in situations where the moving party cannot
demonstrate excusable neglect.

For example, courts have denied

leave to amend where the moving party was aware of the facts on
which the amendment was based for some time prior to the filing
of the motion to amend."); Hayes v. New England Mi11work

-22221X25392 1

Distribs. . Inc. . 602 F. 2d 15, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1979) (party must
show valid reason for neglect and delay).13
In this case, Myers has no reasonable excuse for the
delay.

This action was commenced in July, 1986.

counterclaim was filed on or about July 22, 1988.

The original
When Myers

finally filed his motion for leave, it had been five years since
this action was commenced and three years since the original
counterclaim was filed.

Myers' only explanation for his delay

in seeking an amendment is that the legal basis for the claim
was only recently settled in the Utah courts by the decision in
Shire Development v. Frontier Investments. 799 P. 2d 221 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).

This explanation does not withstand scrutiny.

The Shire decision did not clarify or address a new or
unique area of the law.

In fact, the Shire court decided the

issue relating to oral partnerships with reference to a 1974
Arizona case, Ellingson v. Sloan. 527 P. 2d 1100 (Ariz. Ct. App.
13

Myers cites Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v. Reichert. 784
P. 2d 1210 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), vacated. 830 P. 2d 252 (Utah
1992). That opinion has been vacated and is not good law. Even
if that decision were good law, the decision supports the
district court' s denial of leave to amend. The court in
Regional Sales observed:
Appellate courts have upheld a trial court' s
denial of a motion to amend where the
amendment is sought late in the course of
the litigation, where there is no adequate
explanation for the delay, and where the
movant was aware of the facts underlying the
proposed amendment long before its filing.
Id. at 1216. Those very considerations are present in the
instant case.
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1974), which in turn relied on a 1925 decision, Eads v. Murphy,
232 P. 877 (Ariz. 1925).

£££ 799 P. 2d at 223.

Contrary to

Myers' assertion, the issue was not "unique," and did not
justify the delay in seeking the amendment.14

As noted in

Hayes v. New England Millwork Distributors. Inc. . 602 F. 2d 15
(1st Cir. 1979), "ignorance or misunderstanding of the law 'has
been held an insufficient basis for leave to amend. ' " Id. at 20
(quoting Goss v. Revlon, Inc. , 548 F. 2d 405, 407 (2d Cir.
1976)).

See also Evans v. Syracuse City School Dist. . 704 F. 2d

44, 47 (2d Cir. 1983).
Myers admits that he has known of the facts and
circumstances that give rise to the partnership claim from the
initiation of the litigation in 1986.
15; R. 377. )

(Brief of Appellants at

An unreasonable delay in seeking amendment after

knowledge of the pertinent facts justifies denial of motion to
amend.

See Westley v. Farmer' s Ins. Exch. . 663 P. 2d 93, 94

(Utah 1983) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying motion to
amend where amendment would have delayed trial and substance of
allegation was known a full year earlier); Gates Leariet Corp. .
823 F. 2d at 387; fif. Chadwick v. Nielsen. 763 P. 2d 817, 820

14

Significantly, the Court in Shire cited the Arizona cases
and the oral partnership issue in explaining its holding in
Shire and not in support of its establishing "new" law in Utah.
See 799 P. 2d at 223-24.
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(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (untimely motion denied where only excuse
was failure to to conduct discovery).15
Myers was unreasonably dilatory in bringing the motion
for leave to file the amended counterclaim.

The district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying Myers' untimely motion
to amend.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED MYERS' CONTRACT
AND QUASI-CONTRACT CLAIMS
A.

Standard of Review16

In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, the
Court nview[s] the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the losing party," and reviews the district court' s
legal conclusions for correctness.

Pratt ex rel. Pratt v.

Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co. , 813 P. 2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991).
The Court will consider only the record properly before the
district court.

I£.

15

Myers argues that Andalex has not sustained any
prejudice to justify denial of his motion. To the contrary. If
the district court had allowed Myers to assert the new
partnership claim, Andalex would have been required to redepose
witnesses and propound additional written discovery. This type
of prejudice justifies denial of the motion. E. a. , Hayes, 602
F. 2d at 20; cf. Evans v. Syracuse City School Dist. . 704 F. 2d
44, 46 (2d Cir. 1983) (delay for significant period of time in
asserting affirmative defense almost invariably results in some
prejudice) (quoting Advocat v. Nexus Indus. . Inc. , 497 F. Supp.
328, 331 (D. Del. 1980)).
16

The Standard of Review set forth herein governs Points
II, III and IV below.
-25221X25392 1

The Court will affirm summary judgment if there are no
genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Co. , 676 P. 2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984).

Frisbee v. K&K Constr.

To defeat a summary

judgment motion, the opposing party must demonstrate facts
supporting each element of its claims.

The "non-moving party's

failure of proof concerning one essential element of that
party7 s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. "
Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical. Inc. . 764 P. 2d 636, 642 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317
(1986)).

Furthermore, "in ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the
prism of the substantive evidentiary burden. "

Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby. Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986); accord Robinson
v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc. , 740 P. 2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
B,

Myers Cannot Maintain an Action on the Contract
and Quasi-Contract Claims by Reason of the Real
Estate Licensing Laws

The district court held that Myers' contract and
quasi-contract claims were barred by the broker licensing
statutes. 17

(R. 370-72. ) There were no issues of material

17

Myers states that the basis for the district court' s
decision was not clearly articulated. (Brief of Appellants at
20. ) There can be no question that the district court found
that both the broker licensing statutes and the Statute of
Frauds precluded Myers' contract and quasi-contract claims. The
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, (R. 370-72), granted
judgment on the second and third causes of action of the
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fact and the ruling of the district court was correct as a
matter of law. 18
An unlicensed person may not bring or maintain an
action in Utah for the recovery of compensation for services
performed which are only authorized to be performed by a
licensed real estate broker.

The pertinent statutory provisions

are contained in title 61, chapter 2, of the Utah Code.

Section

61-2-18(1) provides:
No person may bring or maintain an action in
any court of this state for the recovery of
a commission, fee, or compensation for any
act done or service rendered which is
prohibited under this chapter to other than
licensed principal brokers, unless the
person was duly licensed as a principal
broker at the time of the doing of the act
or rendering the service.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(1) (1989).

Section 61-2-2(7)(a)

defines "principal broker" as follows:

Complaint which sought a declaratory judgment that Myers' claims
against Andalex were barred by the Statute of Frauds and the
broker licensing statutes. The Order also granted summary
judgment on the first and second causes of action of the
counterclaim, which were Myers' contract and quasi-contract
claims against Andalex. Regardless, the Court may affirm on any
basis supported by the record. See supra note 5.
18

Myers states that Andalex conceded Myers' version of
the facts in connection with the motion because Andalex failed
to respond in its reply memorandum to Myers' factual
contentions. (Brief of Appellants at 20. ) This statement is
not correct. In fact, in its reply memorandum, Andalex
addressed many of Myers' factual assertions, and demonstrated
that those assertions were insufficient to deny the motion for
summary judgment. (E. g. . R. 354, 358-60. ) The remainder of
Myers' factual assertions were deemed sufficiently immaterial to
merit a specific response.
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[A]ny person who for another and for
valuable consideration, or who with the
intention or in the expectation or upon the
promise of receiving or collecting valuable
consideration, sells, exchanges, purchases,
rents or leases, . . . or assists or directs
in the procuring of prospects or the
negotiation or closing of any transaction
which does or is calculated to result in the
sale, exchange, leasing or renting of any
real estate. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(7)(a) (1989) (emphasis added). 19
Section 61-2-2(8) defines "real estate" to include leaseholds
and business opportunities involving real property.
Ann. § 61-2-2(8) (1989).20

Utah Code

See also Chase v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d

125, 339 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1959) (holding that an oil and gas
lease was real estate for purposes of the broker licensing
provisions).
The services allegedly provided by Myers fall within
the provisions of section 61-2-2(7).

In Diversified General

Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, Inc. , 584 P. 2d 848 (Utah 1978),
the plaintiff argued he did not need to be a licensed broker to
recover a finder' s fee because his duties under the contract
were merely to find or locate a prospective buyer, and nothing
more.

Id. at 849-50.

The Utah Supreme Court rejected

plaintiff s argument and held that the plaintiff s actions fell
19

Section 61-2-2 was amended in 1991. The substance of the
definition of "principal broker" remains the same. See Utah
Code Ann. § 61-2-2(9)(d) (Supp. 1992).
20

Section 61-2-2 was amended in 1991 and the definition of
real estate is now found in section 61-2-2(10). See Utah Code
Ann. § 61-2-2(10) (Supp. 1992).
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within the statutory definition of a broker.

In reaching its

decision, the Court cited with approval Corson v. Keane, 72 A. 2d
314 (N.J. 1950).

In Corson, the plaintiff argued that he need

not be licensed because his duties were merely to bring the
buyer and seller together.

The Corson court dismissed the

argument, noting:
If the statute does not apply to such a
situation, then it is a toothless
enactment . . . .
In short, every
unlicensed broker will be enabled to carry
on his business just as he did before the
statute came into existence, simply by
calling himself a finder, an originator, an
introducer, instead of a broker.
Corson, 72 A. 2d at 316 (citing Baird v. Krancer, 246 N. Y. S. 85,
88 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1930); Diversified Gen. . 584 P. 2d at 851
(quoting Corson).21
Myers argues that he was not a "principal broker," as
defined by section 61-2-2(7), because the services he provided
were not of a nature contemplated by the "purpose" of the
licensing requirements for principal brokers. n

To accept

Myers' argument requires the Court to ignore the clear and
21

Recovery by a plaintiff on a claim that is barred by
reason of section 61-2-18, of the Utah Code, is not permitted
based on a theory of quantum meruit. Baugh v. Parley. 112 Utah
1, 184 P. 2d 335, 339 (1947); accord. Watts v. Andrews, 649 P. 2d
472, 474 (N. M. 1982).
22

Myers contends that the purpose of the licensing
provisions is to protect the public from unscrupulous real
estate brokers and to insure honesty and integrity. Incredibly,
Myers seems to suggest that the services he provided did not
require honesty and integrity and therefore the services do not
fall within the purpose of the statute.
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unambiguous terms of sections 61-2-18(1) and 61-2-2(7).

Myers

argues that the purpose of the statute prevail over literal,
technical interpretations.

He fails to recognize, however, that

the best evidence of a statute' s purpose is the language of the
statute.

E. a. , Janson ex rel. Janson v. Christensen, 808 P. 2d

1222, 1223 (Ariz. 1991).

Because the language is the best

evidence of meaning, courts will only consider matters extrinsic
to the language of a statute when there is some ambiguity or
uncertainty as to the statute' s meaning or application.

This

issue was directly addressed by this Court in Cox Rock Products
v. Walker Pipeline Construction, 754 P. 2d 672 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

The Court stated:
[T]here exists no ambiguous language or
inconsistency which the court must interpret
or construe to explain its exact meaning.
'We will interpret and apply [a] statute
according to its literal wording unless it
is unreasonably confused or inoperable. '
Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. R.
Co. . 749 P. 2d 660, 672 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Since the language is clear, and only
one meaning can be derived from an express
exclusion, it is not appropriate to look to
legislative history. ' There is nothing to
construe where there is no ambiguity in the
statute. ' State v. Archuletta, 526 P. 2d
911, 912 (Utah 1974). S^e Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm' n. 107
Utah 502, 505, 155 P. 2d 184, 185 (Utah 1945)
(statutory interpretation ' must be based on
the language used, . . . and the court has
no power to rewrite a statute to make it
conform to an intention not expressed' ).
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754 P.2d at 676.

See also Intermountain Smelting Corp. v.

Cardtano, 610 P. 2d 334, 337 (Utah 1980); Cannon v. Gardner, 611
P.2d

1207, 1208-09 (Utah 1980).
In any event, the services provided by Myers do fall

within the purpose of the licensing statutes.
clearly apply to "finders."

Those statutes

Diversified Gen. . 584 P. 2d at 851.

Since the legislature intended the licensing requirements to
apply to "finders," then the legislature must have intended the
purpose of the statute (i.e., protection of the public) to apply
to finders and parties dealing with finders.

Thus, even though

Myers may have only been acting as a "finder," the purpose of
the statute still applies.

Furthermore, contrary to Myers'

contention, 23 corporate plaintiffs, including Andalex, are
entitled to the protection of the statute, regardless of their
s ophi s t i cat i on.
Myers seems to argue that because his compensation for
acting as a finder was a partnership interest with Andalex, he
was not acting as a broker.
language of the statute.

This argument ignores the express

The term "principal broker" is not

defined by the method of compensation, but, rather, by
consideration of the acts performed and whether the broker had
an "expectation" of receiving "valuable consideration."
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(7)(a) (1989).

See Brief of Appellants at 21.
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See

In this case, Myers was to receive "valuable
consideration," i.e., the alleged partnership interest, as
compensation for bringing the parties together. 24

Clearly,

Myers was acting as a "principal broker" within the meaning of
Utah's broker licensing statute, and he was required to be
licensed. 25

Because he was not, the trial court properly

dismissed Myers' contract and quasi-contract claims.
C.

The Contract and Quasi-Contract Claims of Myers
Against Andalex are Barred by the Statute of
Frauds

The district court also found that Myers' contract and
quasi-contract claims were barred by the Statute of Frauds. 26
L

See supra note 10 (describing the purpose of the
Grace/Myers agreement which Andalex allegedly assumed).
25

The Court should also note that Myers has provided no
support for his contention that indeed there was an agreement
between Myers and Andalex. Myers makes this factual conclusion
in Brief of Appellants at 9, U 17. To support the contention,
Myers cites pages 213-14 of the Record, at which Andalex's
Memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment is
found. Presumably, Myers is citing to paragraph 11 of Andalex's
Statement of Facts, which recites Myers' contention based upon
his allegations contained in his counterclaim. It does not
support the "facts" asserted by Myers in his Brief.
Furthermore, a citation to one' s own pleading to support a
factual contention in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment, which is what in effect Myers has done, is
inappropriate and the contention should be disregarded. Hall v.
Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224, 226-27 (Utah 1983); Thornock v. Cook.
604 P. 2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979); United Am. Life Ins. Co. v.
Willev. 21 Utah 2d 279, 444 P. 2d 755, 758-59 (1968).
26

Myers claims that the district court did not state its
grounds for granting summary judgment. (Brief of Appellants at
22) As noted earlier, there is no question that the district
court found that both the Statute of Frauds and the broker
licensing statutes precluded Myers' contract and quasi-contract
-32221X25392.1

(R. 370-72.)

There were no issues of material fact and the

ruling of the district court was correct as a matter of law. 27
Under the Utah Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 255-4(5) (1989),28 every agreement authorizing or employing an
agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate29 for

claims. See supra note 17. In any event, this Court may affirm
on any basis supported by the record. See supra note 5.
27

Myers has not made a proper citation to the record to
support his contention that there was any agreement between him
and Andalex. See supra note 25.
l

*

Section 25-5-4 provides:
In the following cases, every agreement
shall be void unless such agreement, or some
note or memorandum of the agreement, is in
writing subscribed by the party to be
charged with the agreement:
(5) Every agreement authorizing or
employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell real estate for
compensation.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989). The relevant portion of the
current version of section 25-5-4 remains substantially the
same. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (Supp. 1992).
29

The subject Leases are "real estate" for purposes of
the Statute of Frauds. The term "real estate" is not defined in
section 25-5-4. However, the term is defined in Utah Code Ann.
§ 68-3-12 (1986) which sets forth various definitions to be used
in construing the statutes of the State of Utah. Section 68-312(10) defines "real estate" to "include land, tenements,
hereditaments, water rights, possessory rights, and claims. "
See also Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(h) (Supp. 1992) (current
version of former § 68-3-12(10)). See also Utah Code Ann. § 571-1(3) (Supp. 1992); Chase v. Morgan. 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 P.2d
1019, 1021 (1959) (holding that an oil and gas lease was real
estate under the broker licensing statute).
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compensation must be in a writing signed by the party to be
charged with the agreement.

The Statute of Frauds "applies

broadly to agreements requiring compensation for brokering real
estate, including finder' s agreements, and not just to contracts
employing brokers to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation. "

Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western

Real Estate & Dev. Co. . 779 P. 2d 230, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
See also C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willev. 758 P. 2d 923, 927 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
Furthermore, the Statute of Frauds applies to
agreements for compensation when the agent' s or broker' s duties
are merely to introduce or provide names of prospective
purchasers, as Myers claims his duties were in this case.

In

C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willev, 758 P. 2d 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
the plaintiff argued that its contract was merely an agreement
for a "finder's fee," and that his duties were only to furnish a
list of prospective purchasers.

£d. at 925 & n. 1.

The

plaintiff claimed that because of the limited nature of his
duties, the statutes governing real estate brokers, including
the Statute of Frauds, were inapplicable.

The Court

specifically held that the Statute of Frauds was applicable to
the plaintiff s agreement.

III. at 927; see also Diversified

Gen. , 584 P. 2d at 234 (Statute of Frauds applies to finder's
agreement); Machan Hampshire, 779 P. 2d at 234.
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According to Myers, he was to act as a "finder" on
behalf of MPM and was to be compensated for his alleged services
in connection with Andalex' s purchase of the Leases.
40. )

(R. 539-

This is clearly an agreement subject to the Statute of

Frauds.

Since there is no written document signed by Andalex

which evinces the alleged agreement, such agreement, if one
existed at all, is void and unenforceable. 30
III.

MYERS' CLAIM OF FRAUD AGAINST ANDALEX WAS PROPERLY
DISMISSED BECAUSE OF A LACK OF EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT
Myers appeals the district court' s order dismissing

his counterclaim31 alleging that Andalex fraudulently
represented that it would compensate him in accordance with the

30

Myers' claim of quantum meruit is likewise barred. A
claim based on an oral contract barred by Section 25-5-4(5),
cannot be used as a basis for recovery on a theory of quantum
meruit. Bauah v. Parley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P. 2d 335, 339-340
(1947); see also. C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Real-estate Broker' s
Right to Recover in Quantum Meruit for Services Although
Contract is Not in Writing as Required by Statute, 41 A. L. R. 2d
905, 906 (1955).
31

The district court also dismissed Myers' claim that
Andalex misrepresented that it intended to enter into a joint
venture agreement with Grace for the purpose of producing coal
from the leases. (R. 133. ) No discussion of this issue appears
in Myers' Brief; we therefore assume Myers has also conceded
this point.
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terms of his agreement with Grace.

The elements of an action

for fraudulent misrepresentation are:
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a
presently existing material fact; (3) which
was false; (4) which the representor
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such
representation; (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it;
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably
and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in
fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby
induced to act; (9) to his injury and
damage.
Duaan v. Jones, 615 P. 2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980).

See also

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch. , 817 P. 2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991).
In resisting this motion for summary judgment, Myers,
who has the burden of proof on this fraud claim, must come forth
with proof in order to avoid summary judgment.

Reeves v. Geiay

Pharmaceutical, Inc. , 764 P. 2d 636, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)).

Myers

must prove each element of his fraud claim, including
intentional misrepresentation, with clear and convincing
evidence.

See Crookston. 817 P. 2d at 800; Territorial Sav. &

Loan Ass/ n v. Baird. 781 P. 2d 452, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see
Sd

Myers has not cited to this Court or the district court
to any admissible evidence, as required by Rule 56(c) of the
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, supporting his claim of
misrepresentation. Rather, Myers relies on his own contentions.
Because Myers' contentions are without support in the record or
in fact, they should be disregarded by this Court. E. a. , Hall
v. Fitzgerald, 671 P. 2d 224, 226-27 (Utah 1983); Thornock v.
Cook, 604 P. 2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979); United Am. Life Ins. Co. v.
Willey. 21 Utah 2d 279, 444 P. 2d 755, 758-59 (1968).
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gtlso Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. . 740 P. 2d 262,
264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (when ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court must consider the standard of proof); Moffat
Enters. , Inc. v. Borden. Inc. , 807 F. 2d 1169, 1178 (3d Cir.
1987) (fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims summarily
dismissed because claimant could not demonstrate he could
satisfy burden of proof).
Andalex' s alleged misrepresentation concerns intended
future acts by Andalex, specifically, an intent to compensate
Myers in the future.

A misrepresentation of intended future

performance is not a "presently existing fact" upon which a
claim for fraud can be based unless the plaintiff can prove that
the representor, at the time of the representation, did not
intend to perform the promise and made the representation for
the purpose of deceiving the promisee.

Cerritos Trucking Co. v.

Utah Venture No. 1. 645 P. 2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982);

Berkeley

Bank For COOPS, V. Meibos. 607 P. 2d 798, 805 (Utah 1980).
The only evidence offered by Myers to support the
element of intent is that Mr. Anderson, the Chief Executive
Officer of Andalex, never disclosed the promise to Keith Smith,
a subordinate of Mr. Anderson7 s who was also working on the
project.

Mr. Anderson's failure to tell Mr. Smith of his

"promise" to compensate Myers is easily explained.

Mr. Anderson

never made such a promise and therefore had nothing to share
with Mr. Smith.

Even if such a promise were made, this alleged
-37-
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"failure" does not support a claim that Mr. Anderson had formed
an intent in his mind to commit an intentional fraud.
For a representation to be actionable, it must have
been made "wilfully and knowingly. "

Marks v. Continental

Casualty Co. , 19 Utah 2d 119, 427 P. 2d 387, 389 (1967).
Mr.

Anderson' s failure to communicate an alleged promise to his

subordinate is simply not evidence of a wilful and knowing
falsehood.

This is particularly evident when viewed in the

context of Mr. Myers' own testimony.

Mr. Myers testified that

he believed that Andalex was honest in its dealings with Myers
and was not attempting to deceive Myers.33

(R. 876-78. )

Myers presented to the district court no evidence of
fraudulent intent to support his claim for fraud.

Because Myers

^As noted, the only basis articulated by Myers to support
his claim of fraud is the failure of Anderson to communicate the
alleged promise to his subordinate. Myers does not urge
nonperformance or nondisclosure in support of his claim. Nor
could he. The mere nonperformance of an alleged agreement will
not support a claim of fraud because nonperformance does not
prove that the representor did not intend to perform at the time
of the representation. Murray v. Xerox Corp. , 811 F. 2d 118, 122
(2d Cir. 1987); Benetton Servs. Corp. v. Benedot, Inc. , 551 So.
2d 295, 298 (Ala. 1989); State Bank of Willev v. States, 723
P. 2d 159, 160 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986). See Cerritos Trucking, 645
P. 2d at 612. Nondisclosure can properly form the basis of a
fraud claim only where there exists "a duty to speak."
Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson. 610 P. 2d 1369, 1373 (Utah
1980). As a matter of law, Andalex had no "duty to speak" in
this arm' s length business transaction. !£. at 1373. See also
Hull v. Flinders. 83 Utah 158, 27 P. 2d 56, 58 (1933) (" [I]f
promise is made in good faith when contract is entered into
there is no fraud though the promisor subsequently changes his
mind and fails or refuses to perform.").
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was unable to satisfy his burden of "clear and convincing"
proof, the motion for summary judgment was properly granted.
IV.

THE CONTRACT CLAIMS AGAINST MPM WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED
The contract claims against MPM were properly

dismissed on two separate grounds.
statutes bar the claims.

First, the broker licensing

Second, MPM did not have an

obligation, expressed or implied, to assure that Andalex
compensated Myers,
A.

The Broker Licensing Statutes Require Myers'
Contract Claims Against MPM Be Dismissed

The essence of Myers7 contract claim against MPM is
that they were to assure that any sublessee, assignee or
purchaser of the Leases, in this instance Andalex, would
compensate Myers for his alleged services of acting as a
"finder" in connection with the transaction.

In other words,

this is an action by Myers to recover compensation for acting as
a " broker. "
As previously discussed, no unlicensed person may
bring or maintain an action in Utah for the recovery of
compensation for services performed which are only authorized to
be performed by a licensed broker.
Ann.

§ 61-2-18(1) (1985).

Supra pp. 26-32; Utah Code

Furthermore, a "finder," which is how

Myers characterizes his involvement, falls within the parameters
of the definition of "broker" contained in section 61-2-2(7).
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(7) (1989); Diversified Gen. Corp. v.
-39221X25392.1

White Barn Golf Course. Inc.. 584 P. 2d 848, 849-50 (Utah 1978)
(a party who brings buyer and seller together is "broker" for
purposes of statute); see supra pp. 28-31.

There is also no

question that Myers is not licensed as a broker.

(R. 595. )

Because Myers was acting as a broker but is not licensed as one,
he is precluded from bringing or maintaining an action to
recover compensation for his service.

Myers argues that the

broker licensing laws are inapplicable to his claim against MPM
because his claim is not an action to recover compensation for
acting as a broker, but rather an action to recover damages for
the failure of MPM to assure that Andalex agreed to compensate
Myers.

The distinction that Myers attempts to make is a

distinction without a difference.

Myers' claim against MPM is

still an action to recover compensation for bringing MPM and
Andalex together.

Instead of seeking recovery directly from

Andalex, the party which Myers claims contractually owes him the
compensation, Myers is simply attempting to recover the same
compensation in the form of damages from MPM.

The pertinent

statutory authority makes no distinction between direct
compensation and damages.

The statute simply provides that an

unlicensed broker cannot maintain an action to recover a fee or
compensation for acting as a broker, regardless of the party
pursued.34
34

In Realty Executives, Inc. v. Northrup, King & Co..
539 P. 2d 514, 517 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975), the court noted that an
unlicensed broker could not recover damages where his action
-40221X25392 1

Moreover, Myers admits that if his claim against MPM
were based upon a theory of suretyship or guaranty, he may be
precluded from maintaining the action,

(Brief of Appellants at

27. ) A surety relationship is defined generally in 72 C. J. S.
Principal and Surety § 2 (1987) as follows:

"The relationship

of principal and surety, or suretyship, in its broadest sense,
is the relationship occupied by a person liable . . . for the
performance of an act by another. ..."

A guaranty is defined in

38 C.J.S. Guaranty § 1 (1943) as follows:

"A guaranty is a

collateral undertaking by one person to answer for . . . the
performance of some . . . duty in case of the default of another
person. ..."

Myers' claim against MPM ij3 in fact based upon a

theory of suretyship or guaranty.

Myers' contention is that MPM

agreed to assure or insist that Andalex would compensate him for
his services.

(Brief of Appellants at 26. ) The alleged

agreement between MPM and Myers, as described by Myers, falls
within the definitions of surety or guaranty. 35

As noted by

Myers, it therefore should be dismissed.

could not be established without a showing that he violated the
law. Likewise, Myers cannot establish his claim against MPM
without showing he violated the law by performing services
without a proper license.
35

Myers' claim is basically that MPM was assuring
Andalex's performance, similar to a performance bonds. A
performance bond creates a suretyship. Qf. Board of County
Supervisors v. Sie-Grav Developers, Inc. , 334 S. E. 2d 542, 546
(Va. 1985).
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Myers' claim is barred as a matter of law under the
broker licensing statutes, and summary judgment was properly
entered.
B.

MPM Had No Implied Contractual Obligation to
Assure Myers' Compensation

Myers' contends36 that his agreement with MPM
contained a covenant of good faith and fair dealing which
required MPM to assure that Andalex compensated Myers so that
Myers would receive his "expectation."37

(Brief of Appellant

at 28. )
Myers testified that his "expectation" regarding the
compensation arrangement between the parties was accurately

db

Before the district court, Myers also urged that MPM had
intentionally interfered with economic relations. This claim
has been dropped on appeal. (Brief of Appellants at 26 n. 65. )
37

The claim against MPM is based in part on the factual
assertion that MPM had insisted that Grace compensate Myers.
(Brief of Appellants at 8, 1F 12; 9, 1F 18; 26. ) In Myers' Brief,
he contends that as a result of such insistence, Grace entered
into an agreement with Myers. (Brief of Appellants at 26. ) To
support this conclusion, Myers cites to his own Memorandum in
Opposition to MPM' s Motion for Summary Judgment. In the
Memorandum, Myers cites to his own answers to interrogatories.
A citation to one' s own answers to interrogatories does not
create an issue of fact to preclude summary judgment, unless the
answer meets the evidentiary requirements of Rule 56(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A & M Enters. , Inc. v. Hunziker,
25 Utah 2d 363, 482 P. 2d 700, 701-02 (1971); £f. Car Ctr. , Inc.
v. Home Indem. Co. , 519 So. 2d 1319, 1322 (Ala. 1988). The
answers to which Myers refers contain mere conclusions and would
not be admissible evidence. Therefore, the answers do not
comply with Rule 56(e). D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P. 2d 420,
421 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, the contention should be
disregarded. See also supra note 32.
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reflected in the letter agreement and subsequent correspondence
between the parties.

(R. 547-52.)

It is undisputed that these

documents do not contain an express obligation for MPM to assure
Myers' compensation.

(R. 540, 545-46, 551-52. )

As a matter of

law, a court will not imply terms to relieve a party from the
express terms of a contract absent mutual assent.

Fowler v.

Taylor, 554 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah 1976) (quoting Rasmussen v.
United States Steel Co. . 1 Utah 2d 291, 265 P. 2d 1002, 1004
(1954)); Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P. 2d 651, 654 (quoting
Rasmus sen).
The letters which comprise the agreement between these
parties do not in anyway suggest or imply that MPM were
obligated to require any such purchaser to compensate Myers.

In

fact, the intent of both parties as manifested by these writings
is to the contrary.
states:

For example, in the May 23 letter Myers

"My intent is to receive any compensation for sub-lease

of coal from the producer of the coal."

(Addendum, Ex. A. )

intent of MPM on this issue was stated in the March 18, 1981
letter as follows:
Insofar as compensation is concerned, you
initially established in your May 23, 1979
letter to our group, that you would seek any
compensation for vour efforts from the
purchaser, and we agreed to allow you to
present qualified purchasers on that basis.
It is not our desire to depart from that
position in any way with respect to your
continued activities.

-43221X25392.1

The

(Addendum, Ex. C) (emphasis added).

This issue was also

addressed in the March 24, 1981 letter from Mono to Myers, where
Mono stated:
It also follows that we are in agreement
that any compensation to which you may be
entitled for finding a buyer for Mono
Powers' interest must be arranged with such
buyer by you and not bv us.
(Addendum, Ex. D) (emphasis added).

Similarly, in a letter from

Pacific to Myers dated May 5, 1980, Pacific stated:
I would like to reiterate our agreement that
any compensation to you for vour efforts
will have to be worked out between you and
interested parties other than [Malapai],
Mono Power, and [Pacific].
(Addendum, Ex. B) (emphasis added).

Myers testified that these

letters accurately reflected his understanding of the agreement.
(R. 547-52. )
The correspondence upon which Myers relies for his
contract claim is clear and unambiguous on the issue of
compensation:

The parties intended and agreed that any

compensation for Myers was to come from the purchaser and that
Myers was obligated to make his own arrangements for
compensation.

Because there is no evidence of mutual assent to

imply a term contrary to these express terms, Myers' claim based
on any such implied term was properly dismissed by the district
court.
Even assuming there was an "agreement" between the
parties which gives rise to an implied covenant of good faith,
-44221X25392.1

such a covenant does not require a party to take affirmative
action to protect the interest of the other party to the
contract.
cases.

This issue has been addressed by a series of Utah

In Ted R. Brown & Assocs. , Inc. v. Carnes Corp. , 753

P. 2d 964 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this Court observed:
It is fundamental that every contract
imposes a duty on the parties to exercise
their contractual rights and perform their
contractual obligations reasonably and in
good faith. Nonetheless, a court may not
make a better contract for the parties than
they have made for themselves; furthermore,
a court may not enforce asserted rights not
supported by the contract itself. '[I]t
cannot be adopted as a general precept of
contract law that, whenever one party to a
contract can show injury flowing from the
exercise of a contract right by the other, a
basis for relief will be somehow devised by
the courts. '
Id. at 970 (citations omitted).

In Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc. ,

812 P. 2d 49 (Utah 1991) the Utah Supreme Court stated with
regard to the implied covenant of good faith:

"Such a covenant

cannot be construed, however, to establish new, independent
rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties."

Ld. at 55.

In Rio Alaom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd. , 618 P. 2d 497 (Utah 1980) the
supreme court emphasized that " [a] court will not enforce
asserted rights that are not supported by the contract itself."
Ifl. at 505.
None of the cases cited by Myers supports his argument
that a contracting party must take affirmative action to protect
the other party to comply with the covenant of good faith.
-45221X25392. 1

In

St. Benedict s Development Co. v. St. Benedict Hospital, 811
P. 2d 194 (Utah 1991), cited by Myers, the defendant was accused
of violating the covenant of good faith because it had taken
affirmative action in contravention of express terms of the
I&. at 198-200.

agreement.

This case has no application here.

Myers' reliance on Steinmeyer v. Warner Consolidated Corp. . 116
Cal. Rptr. 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974), is also misplaced.

In that

case, the court stated that each party has a duty "to do
everything the contract presupposes. "

Ij&. at 60 (quoting Harm

v. Frasher, 5 Cal. Rptr. 367, 374 (Cal. Ct. App. I960)).

The

court did not express or infer that a party must take
affirmative action outside the contract terms to protect the
other party.
Myers relies on Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 369 (1980), for his argument that in denying Myers his
expected compensation, MPM improperly exercised discretion
granted under the agreement in a way not contemplated by the
parties.

This argument is simply erroneous.

The contemplation

of the parties is set forth in the correspondence between them.
Myers does not dispute this.

The correspondence, as noted

above, states that Myers is to make his own arrangements for
compensation.

Nowhere is there any suggestion in that

correspondence that the parties contemplated that MPM would
assure compensation to Myers.

Furthermore, the article relied
-46-
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upon by Myers states that when discretion is exercised for a
legitimate purpose, the covenant is not violated.

£&. at 384-85

("The courts, mindful that good faith should not be used as a
vehicle for judicial fiat, defer to a party who acts with no
improper purpose.").

Myers has presented no evidence that

suggests that the transaction with Andalex was not a legitimate
business transaction, or done in bad faith or for an improper
purpose.
If, in fact, an enforceable agreement exists between
Myers and MPM, it is set forth in the various letters referenced
above.

At no point in his Brief does Myers attempt to challenge

or refute the clear and unmistakable language of that
correspondence.

Those letters unambiguously provide that any

compensation to Myers was to come from the potential purchaser
and such compensation was to be arranged by Myers.

There is

nothing in the correspondence that even suggests that MPM had a
duty to assure Myers1 compensation.
Myers' argument that the covenant of good faith
required MPM to assure Myers' compensation is taking the
covenant to the extreme and absurd.

The covenant simply does

not require a party to forego its rights and privileges under a
contractual arrangement to protect the other party.
required is good faith.

There is no showing that MPM failed to

-47221X25392.1

All that is

exercise good faith.

The district court' s order of summary

judgment on this issue should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Myers has presented no evidence or argument that
justifies reversal of the trial court' s decisions below.

The

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Myers'
efforts to add, in an action that had been pending for five
years, a claim that was itself legally insufficient as a matter
of law.

Moreover, the trial court properly entered judgment in

favor of Andalex and MPM on all claims between the parties.

The

trial court properly held that Myers' contract claims were
barred by the real estate licensing statutes and Statute of
Frauds and that his fraud claim failed for lack of proof.

The

trial court' s decision should be affirmed.
DATED this 12th day of January, 1993.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
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Tab A

RICHARD B. MYERS
P. 0. BOX 301
MADISONVILLE, KENTUCKY 42431

May 23, 1979

I, Richard 6. Myers, P. 0. Box 301, Madisonville,
Kentucky 42431 will act as agent for the Resource Company
for the sole purpose of leasing or the selling of federal
and state leases now owned by Resource Company located in
Kaiparowits Plateau, south central Utah.
As previously agreed 1 will get approval from you
before presenting this property and or leases to any mining
firm or producer. I will attempt to sub-lease the properties
as recommended by Mr. Nugent and would consider sale of
leases with your consent only. My intent is to receive any
compensation for sub-lease of coal from the producer of
the coal. Should a sales agreement be reached with your
consent my commission fee would be five percent on the
first million and two percent on all over the one million
dollars.
Knowing that this will not be a short term project
I would appreciate your designating a length of time to
be allowed for me to come up with a producer. Should 1
introduce a producer and it takes a greater time to arrange
the deal than alloted me I would still consider myself
the finder.
I understand that you have the right to refuse any
mining company or producer that is not acceptable to your
firm.
ACCEPTED BY:

PROPOSED BY:

<2£W&
$ *

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
to

TabB

NEW ALBION RESOURCES CO.
P. O. BOX 165 • SAN DIEGO, CALIF 92112

May 5, 1980

Mr. Richard B. Myers
P.O. Box 301
«*!adisonville, Kentucky

42431

Dear Mr. Myers:
This lettter is in response to your recent
activities and ycur letter of February 13. Speaking
for NARCO and our partners, we arc very impressed with
the collective effort that you and the Xoppers Company
personnel put into the assessment cf our Kaiparowits
lease* as a source of coal for L Koppers methanol
installation, l?e would be willing to look at ether
interested parties that you present to us on a case by
case basis until such time as we indicate otherwise.
X would like to reiterate our agreement that
any compensation to you for your efforts will have to
be worked out between you and interested parties other
than NARCO, Mono Power* and Resources Co. 2 look forward
to meeting with you and your prospective Kaiparowits
coal lease developers.

mo/
cc;

James M. Nugent
General Manager* NARCO
J. L. Wilson
PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

ZJ

TabC

RESOURCES
f. O. k i 20124

•
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March 18, 1981

Mr. Richard B. Myers
Myers k Company
P.O. Box 301
Madiaonville, KY 42431
Dear Mr. Myers:
This letter is written to you in order to confirm a
telephone conference call on Monday, March 16, 1981, between
yourself and representatives of Resources Company, New
Albion Resources Company and Mono Power Company. The
matters discussed in the following paragraphs represent the
position of Resources Company only, and do not reflect the
relative positions of New Albion or Mono.
A copy of your December 23, 1980 letter to Ron Watkins
has been furnished to us. Naturally, wa are somewhat
disappointed and confused by your reluctance to execute our
November 12, 1980 letter to you, because we do believe that
it accurately describes the relationship between yourself
and the Companies.
Be that as it may, we do believe it is necessary that
there be some clear understanding regarding the relationship
between you and our company, both individually and as a
member of the group with New Albion and Mono, particularly
in light of tha statement in your December 23, 1980 letter
to the affect that you will continue working with W.R. Grace
& Company as long as there is a possibility of an agreement
being reached with our group.
Wa hava no objection to your continued efforts to
accomplish a sala of our Kaiparowits interests to W.R. Grace
& Company provided, however, that you recognize that
Resources Company has never given to you - and does not now
give to you - any exclusive right to represent us. As you
have always been aware, we have had various discussions with
other qualified purchasers not introduced by you and we
intend to continue such further discussions at our option.
These in no way will establish any rights in your favor
should a sale be concluded with a purchaser who was not
introduced to us by you.
PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

Mr. Richard B. Myers
March 18, 1981
Page -2-

Insofar as compensation is concerned, you initially
established in your May 23, 1979 letter to our group, that
you would seek any compensation for your efforts from the
purchaser, and we agreed to allow you to present qualified
purchasers on that basis. It is not our desire to depart
from that position in any way with respect to your continued
activities.
Inasmuch as no sales have yet been concluded between the
Companies, or any one of them, and a qualified purchaser
presented by you, we do not agree that - as you state in
your December 23 letter - your company has fulfilled the
expectations of your May 23, 1979 letter. We intend,
however, to abide by the terms of your May 23, 1979 letter
in any further dealings between us.
We do regret the confusion and delay which has surrounded this matter, but we trust that you will understand
our position and conduct your activities in recognition of
it.
Please indicate your acceptance of the foregoing by
written confirmation at your earliest opportunity.
Very truly yours,

Bernard Gass
Vice President

J*

TabD

Mono Power Company
p e toitoe
1 1 4 4 WALNUT GMOVC AVtNUC
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March 24, 1981

"I'V
Mr. Richard B. Myers
Myers & Company
P. 0. Box 301
Madisonville, KY 42431
Dear Mr. Myers:
This letter is in confirmation of the matters discussed
in a telephone conference call held March 16, 1981, between
you and the undersigned, for Mono Power Company, Mr. Ferguson,
for Resources Company, and Mr. Nugent, for New Albion
Resources Co., as well as the content of the letter representing the views of Resources Co., vhich was read to you on
the telephone.
While we generally concur in the position stated In
the Resources Co. letter, we wanted to emphasize that we have
been and are now engaged in an intensive exploration of means
to utilize the.coal produced at Kalparowits in various projects,
and necessarily must stay flexible in our dealing with any
potential buyers. Consequently, no negotiation with any person
in vhich we participated ever contemplated a firm, non-exclusive
commitment to any potential buyer or sublessee, and, as you
are aware, there were a number of negotiations with others
going on at the same time. This must continue to be the case.
It also follows that we are in agreement that any
compensation to vhich you might be entitled for finding a buyer
for Mono Power's interest must be arranged with such buyer by
you and not by us.
Ve share the regret of the other participants in the
Kalparowits project that there has been a misunderstanding regarding your representation and the focus of your activities,
but ve believe that such misunderstanding can be avoided in
the future by being sure that the vievs and objectives of each
of the participants are clear to you.
Very truly yours.
*4*£C4/L

bcc: W. H. Seaman
C. B. McCarthy
R. J. Cahall
U.,1 - ~
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